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Democratic Ruptures and Electoral
Outcomes in Africa: Ghana’s 2016
Election
George M. Bob-Milliar and Jeffrey W. Paller 
Abstract: Repetitive elections are important benchmarks for assessing 
the maturity of Africa’s electoral democracies. Yet the processes through 
which elections entrench a democratic culture remain understudied. We 
introduce an important mechanism called a democratic rupture: an in-
fraction in the democratisation process during competitive elections that 
has the potential to cause a constitutional crisis. It provides a new avenue 
of citizen participation outside of voting, and political space for opposi-
tion party realignment and to strengthen its support. Drawing from the 
case of Ghana, we show how the 2012 presidential election petition 
challenge served as a democratic rupture by contributing to the opposi-
tion’s victory in 2016, enabling its political development. First, it exposed 
flaws in the electoral system and led to demands for electoral reforms. 
Second, it led to citizens being better educated on the electoral process. 
Third, it taught political parties that vigilance at the polling stations can 
help win elections. The article provides a critical analysis of the factors 
that shape democratic development, especially in cases where opposition 
parties defeat incumbent politicians. 
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Africa is a continent with a strong incumbency advantage at the presi-
dential level (Cheeseman 2015: 146). Between 1990 and 2009, there were 
only nine instances of an opposition candidate defeating a sitting incum-
bent; four of these cases were in founding elections, while three took 
place in Madagascar (Cheeseman 2010). Incumbent parties are also more 
likely to lose support in open-seat polls, where an incumbent president is 
not contesting (Posner and Young 2007). This contributes to a context 
where defeating an incumbent president is a highly unlikely affair. The 
inability of opposition parties to defeat incumbents is a potential threat 
to a country’s broader democratisation process, as governing parties can 
consolidate economic, social, and political control over the citizenry. 
This leads to a puzzling question: What is the process through which 
opposition party candidates defeat presidential incumbents in African 
elections? 
Two bodies of scholarship can help answer this question. One set 
of studies points to the process of democratic learning through elections 
as a possible mechanism through which democracy is strengthened, 
contributing to its potential to strengthen political competition. This can 
bolster the strength of the opposition, and contribute to the latter’s fu-
ture electoral victory. In his theory of “democratization by elections,” 
Staffan Lindberg suggests that the reiteration of multiparty elections has 
a “self-reinforcing power” that can entrench a democratic culture within 
a country (Lindberg 2009: 25–46). This approach emphasises the im-
portance of a well-institutionalised party system, citizen trust in the 
electoral process, and the existence of a vibrant civil society and free 
media. This scholarship appropriately focuses its attention on the struc-
ture of the citizenry and political system, yet it fails to uncover the 
important process and mechanisms through which opposition parties 
demand political reforms and gain a voice in the decision-making pro-
cess. 
An alternative approach points to how political parties win elec-
tions. These studies focus on the role of ethnic identity, the state of the 
economy, and the public management of the bureaucracy. The strength 
of this research is in the close attention it pays to context, as well as its 
treatment of African politicians as rational actors. However, by treating 
elections as fixed events, it obscures the important politics that can occur 
between electoral periods. In addition, it focuses mostly on the immedi-
ate campaign period and voting tabulation procedures. The long process 
of electioneering is missed in this analysis, especially the strategies and 
tactics of the opposition. 
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Our approach in this paper1 combines these two bodies of scholar-
ship to explain when the process of democratic learning can open 
political space for the opposition to defeat presidential incumbent candi-
dates. We suggest that this is a very important aspect of the democratisa-
tion process, but one that is currently undertheorised in the democratisa-
tion-by-elections framework. In particular, we advance the new concept 
democratic rupture: an infraction in the democratisation process during 
competitive elections that has the potential to cause a constitutional 
crisis. Democratic ruptures are important for democratisation because 
they can provide new avenues of citizen participation outside of voting, 
political space for opposition party alignment, and opportunities for the 
opposition to mobilise new supporters. This concept draws from norma-
tive democratic theorists, who emphasise the importance of rupture – or 
a radical break from the past – in governing a democratic society. 
We analyse the crucial case of Ghana’s 2016 election to substantiate 
our theory (Gerring 2007). Many scholars were concerned about demo-
cratic backsliding before the elections, despite the country’s label as one 
of Africa’s most robust democracies. Some analysts went so far as to 
suggest that Ghana’s model democracy was in danger of faltering (Bekoe 
and Burchard 2016). Distrust in the Electoral Commission (EC) was 
high. According to the Afrobarometer, only 37 per cent of Ghanaians 
trusted their electoral commission “somewhat” or “a lot,” well below the 
average of 50 per cent across the continent (Penar et al. 2016). Fifty-four 
per cent of Ghanaians worried that party activists would commit vio-
lence (CDD-Ghana 2016a). The stakes were particularly high because an 
incumbent head of state had never lost power in Ghana’s Fourth Repub-
lic. Yet in the end, the opposition won by a landslide, the incumbent 
conceded, the EC managed a credible poll, and the country remained a 
model democracy on the continent. 
We use a combination of qualitative research methods, drawing on 
data from ethnographic observation covering the past eight years (Schatz 
2009). We attended both parties’ national delegates’ congresses (2007, 
2010, 2014), campaign rallies, and party branch meetings to understand 
the ways that political parties devise campaign strategies and understand 
the electoral terrain. Further, we conducted elite interviews to under-
                                                 
1 Bob-Milliar thanks the A.G. Leventis Foundation for providing him with a 
visiting research fellowship to the Centre of African Studies/University of 
Cambridge, where this article took shape. We also wish to thank Adam Branch, 
Kwame Ninsin, Jon Kraus, Emmanuel Sowatey, Ernest Plange Kwofie, the two 
anonymous referees, and the editor for constructive advice. Nevertheless, we 
are solely responsible for any shortcomings and mistakes. 




stand the nuances of electoral politics. We conducted ten interviews with 
five parliamentarians from each of the two main parties in Accra, Ku-
masi, Tamale, Bolgatanga, and Wa. We also interviewed five party 
executives each from the two main parties’ executive leaderships at the 
national and grassroots levels. We conducted a comprehensive review of 
primary documents including party manifestos and policy statements to 
understand the positions of political parties, as well as to process-trace 
the critical junctures in the democratisation process. 
We find that the 2012 presidential election petition challenge served 
as a democratic rupture by contributing to the opposition’s victory in 
2016, enabling the country’s political development. First, it exposed 
flaws in the electoral system and led to demands for electoral reforms. 
Second, it led to citizens being better educated on the electoral process. 
Third, it taught the political parties that vigilance at the polling stations 
helps win elections. The democratic rupture had important implications 
for the 2016 election, in which the opposition was victorious over an 
incumbent president for the first time in the Fourth Republic.2 These 
empirical results suggest that the process of democratic deepening re-
quires an opening of the political arena for the opposition party to 
destabilise the status quo, but also to win the following election. This 
offers a new and overlooked mechanism to the democratisation-by-elec-
tions framework. 
The article proceeds in seven parts: First, we introduce the crucial 
case of Ghana’s 2016 election. Then, we discuss the existing explanations 
that have been advanced to explain the conditions under which incum-
bents can be defeated in democracies with weak institutions. Following 
that, we highlight the shortcomings of those explanations and introduce 
our concept of democratic rupture. We go on to provide empirical evi-
dence for how the 2012 electoral petition served as a key democratic 
rupture by exposing flaws in the political system. Afterwards, we illus-
trate how democratic ruptures contributed to political party realignment. 
We then justify our claims by showing how new avenues of citizen par-
ticipation are crucial, and we conclude by delineating the implications of 
our argument for other African countries. 
  
                                                 
2 Samuel Huntington (1991) highlights the importance of electoral turnovers in 
the democratisation process. 
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Ghana’s 2016 Election 
Ghanaians voted in presidential and parliamentary elections on 7 De-
cember 2016. The ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the 
opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) dominated political competition.3 
The elections recorded voter turnout of 69.25 per cent, and international 
and domestic observers adjudged the polls to be free, fair, and credible. 
Of the 10,713,734 valid votes cast, the NPP opposition candidate, Nana 
Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, won with 5,755,758 votes, or 53.72 per 
cent. The incumbent, John Dramani Mahama of the NDC, polled 
4,771,188 votes, or 44.53 per cent (EC 2018). 
In Parliament, the NPP won a majority with 169 seats (61.45 per 
cent), and the NDC captured 106 seats (38.54 per cent).4 Even though 
the NPP were slight favourites according to pre-election surveys (CDD-
Ghana 2016a), a last-minute blitz of infrastructure commissioned by the 
incumbent NDC attempted to overshadow the NPP’s campaign. For 
example, on 26 November 2016, the president commissioned six major 
projects in the Central Region, including a modern Kotokuraba market, 
Moree Community Senior High School, Ofaakor Community Day SHS, 
Kasoa interchange, and Komenda Sugar Factory. 
Indeed, having suffered defeats in the 2008 and 2012 elections, and 
learning the lessons from its election petition, the NPP spent the previ-
ous three years improving its campaign machinery. By contrast, the 
incumbent NDC administration struggled to address major economic 
issues and was forced to confront several political scandals. Overall, the 
elections were a referendum to determine which of the two main parties 
was viewed as being a more effective manager of the developing econo-
my boosted by revenue from oil and gas resources, signalling an 
important shift in the democratic process to programmatic campaigning 
and debate. Despite this context of campaigning, the process through 
which the opposition created political space to defeat the incumbent 
remains unexplained. Due to the lack of empirical cases of opposition 
victories against incumbent candidates in African elections, the 2016 
election serves as a crucial case to examine the processes and mechan-
isms that can lead to this outcome. 
                                                 
3 The remaining four parties – the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), Convention 
People’s Party (CPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), and National 
Democratic Party (NDP) – were reduced to what Paul Nugent (2001b) evoca-
tively called “also rans.” 
4 None of the minor parties won a seat in the parliamentary polls. 




Democratisation and Electoral Outcomes in 
Ghana
Ghana has an open political system with very competitive elections. The 
seven contested multiparty elections held between 1992 and 2016 have 
imbued Ghana’s electoral politics with a well-institutionalised party sys-
tem (Whitfield 2009), popular support and participation in elections 
(Ninsin 2016; Daddieh 2011; Gyimah-Boadi 2009), and a vibrant civil 
society and free media (Arthur 2010). The consensus among political 
actors and civil society organisations is that the country’s electoral man-
agement systems are adequate (CDD-Ghana 2016a). More importantly, 
the electoral choices of the majority of Ghanaians are based on issues 
(Harding 2015; Lindberg and Morrison 2008). 
Scholars in the democratisation-by-elections tradition offer some 
important lessons for the potential of the opposition to win the 2016 
election. In his attempt to explain the process of democratisation in 
formerly authoritarian states, Schedler (2002) suggests that the conduct 
of elections impacts the function of governing regimes significantly be-
cause they shape the exercise of executive and legislative behaviour 
(Schedler 2006). But elections are equally important for opposition par-
ties, as they provide political space to change institutional rules that 
could lead to electoral victories for opposition parties in the future. 
According to Lindberg (2006), holding competitive elections im-
proves civil liberties by strengthening civil society, creating democratic 
citizens, and providing new roles for state institutions. Yet despite these 
structural characteristics, Ghana’s political system is hampered by a lack 
of accountability and by political clientelism that privileges the incum-
bent regime (Paller 2014). In addition, prior to the 2016 election, an 
opposition candidate had never defeated an incumbent presidential can-
didate. Ghana still suffered from a strong incumbency bias that the 
democratisation-by-elections framework cannot explain. Instead, we 
focus on the avenues of citizen participation and the strengthening of 
the opposition party that are important to the deepening of democracy, 
particularly in a strong and centralised state that favours the incumbent 
(Arriola 2012). 
By contrast, there is abundant scholarship about how political par-
ties win elections, and from whom they draw their political support. 
Regional identification is crucial to the electoral process (Nugent 2001a; 
Fridy 2007). Voters in the Upper East, Upper West, Northern, and Volta 
regions identify mainly with the NDC, while the NPP enjoys substantial 
support from the Ashanti and Eastern regions (see Table 1, which pro-
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vides context for past performance of political parties across regions). 
Voter preferences have long been linked to ethnic considerations, espe-
cially the instrumentalisation of ethnicity in party platforms (Nugent 
2001a, 2001b; Fridy 2007). In contrast to ethnic-based explanations,  
only about one in ten voters is decisively influenced by either cli-
entelism or ethnic and family ties in choosing political representa-
tives, while 85 to 90 per cent behave as mature democratic 
citizens. (Lindberg and Morrison 2008: 96)  
Table 1. Presidential Election Results by Region: 1996–2016 
Region New Patriotic Party 
 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Western  40.90 50.54 56.64 47.55 43.80 52.3
Central  43.30 49.68 58.57 45.97 45.53 53.2
Greater Accra 43.30 52.52 51.99 46.03 46.92 52.4
Eastern 45.00 54.97 60.27 57.14 56.91 63.3
Brong-Ahafo 36.00 50.57 51.96 50.56 39.11 54.8
Ashanti 65.80 74.73 74.61 72.40 70.86 75.9
Volta 4.70 8.48 14.26 14.98 12.93 17.3
Northern  33.00 29.56 36.20 38.27 39.11 41.8
Upper West  11.20 15.51 32.23 37.72 29.26 35.9
Upper East 17.40 21.46 31.66 35.25 29.29 34.9
       
Region National Democratic Congress 
 1996 2000 1996 2008 1996 2016 
Western  57.30 43.93 40.89 47.06 54.42 45.3
Central  55.20 43.73 39.21 50.58 52.12 43.4
Greater Accra 54.00 42.68 46.37 52.11 52.31 46.6
Eastern 53.80 41.34 38.38 41.10 42.03 35.6
Brong-Ahafo 61.70 44.62 46.05 47.70 51.49 44.9
Ashanti 32.80 22.49 24.06 26.13 28.35 23.3
Volta 94.50 86.18 83.83 82.88 85.47 80.9
Northern  61.20 50.07 56.94 56.84 58.23 55.5
Upper West  74.60 62.29 56.67 54.36 65.54 58.3
Upper East 69.00 52.07 53.90 56.06 66.43 60.3
Source: Compiled from the EC 2018. 
In sum, explanations for voting behaviour range from regional identifica-
tions to ethnic considerations, development preferences, and historical 




experiences (Jockers, Kohnert, and Nugent 2010; Fridy 2007; Morrison 
and Hong 2006; Ayee 2002; Bob-Milliar 2011). 
New explanatory variables were introduced into the equation to ac-
count for Ghanaian voter preferences after the outcome of the 2000 and 
2008 elections. The management of the economy by the ruling elites and 
public perception of corruption contributed to voter preferences (Ayee 
2002; Daddieh 2011; Whitfield 2009; Gyimah-Boadi 2009). The elec-
torate now evaluated political performance based on the provision of 
public welfare programmes (Whitfield 2009). While these explanations 
go a long way towards explaining the structure of Ghana’s electoral ter-
rain, they are less able to explain the process of political party 
mobilisation during the context of campaigns, and do not fully account 
for the strategies that opposition parties use to gain a voice in political 
decision-making. We suggest that the concept of democratic rupture can 
fill this gap. 
Democratic Ruptures 
The concept of democratic rupture has its roots in agonist theories of 
democracy. For theorists like Jacques Rancière, the very meaning of 
democracy is “the rupture in the logic of archê,” or rule (Rancière 1999: 
29–30). Patchen Markell explains that this “takes place when those who 
have ‘no part’ within a regime suddenly appear and speak in public with-
out authorization” (Markell 2006: 3). The moment of rupture is a revolu-
tionary moment when democracy, or popular sovereignty, is officially 
realised (Archer 2013). This is akin to Barrington Moore’s famous claim 
that the path to democracy requires a “revolutionary break from the 
past” (Moore 1966). 
Our conceptualisation of democratic rupture takes the basic theo-
retical point of political rupture – a juncture in the political arena where a 
marginalised population enters political decision-making – but embeds it 
in the institutional realm of elections. By combining this normative theo-
retical concept with the more empirical democratisation-by-elections 
framework, we are better able to show how electoral campaigns and 
broader political transformations are linked. We define this concept as a 
democratic rupture, or an infraction in the democratisation process dur-
ing competitive elections that has the potential to cause a constitutional 
crisis. Democratic ruptures can provide new avenues of citizen participa-
tion outside of voting, political space for opposition party realignment, 
and the opportunity for the opposition to strengthen its support. 
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The strength of this approach rests in thinking about elections in 
the broader context of democratic deepening or erosion. In weakly insti-
tutionalised electoral systems, democratic ruptures can occur during 
flawed elections. As Andreas Schedler explains, flawed elections contrib-
ute to a situation where “the competition for votes and the struggle for 
electoral reform go hand in hand” (Schedler 2002: 118). He continues,  
The intensity of electoral competition is closely related to the per-
ceived need for regime legitimation […] and to the organizational 
capacity of opposition parties, including their ability to monitor 
voting and defend their victories. (Schedler 2002: 115) 
In this way, the consideration of democratic ruptures focuses our atten-
tion on the role of opposition parties, and how they attempt to enter the 
decision-making sphere even when they are unable to win the contested 
election. 
Most importantly, democratic ruptures can directly contribute to 
electoral victories in the future. They are one mechanism through which 
opposition parties can realign and destabilise the status quo, providing an 
opening for electoral victory the next time around. This provides an 
important addition to the democratisation-by-elections framework. By 
altering the logic of rule, as the agonists describe it, democratic ruptures 
shift electoral competition to favour a set of people that were previously 
left out of the decision-making process. 
The outcomes of democratic ruptures depend on the underlying in-
stitutional environment. For example, in open political systems where 
the rule of law and civil rights are protected from undue political inter-
ference, constitutional courts can resolve electoral disputes. Such 
environments have the potential to produce critical democratic citizens 
and reform the electoral system. In the antecedent literature, we find our 
concept similar to “political ruptures,” which Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
use to explain changes in the European electoral system. Democratic 
ruptures are distinct from other kinds of societal ruptures because they 
specify major democratic openings in the political system – speaking truth 
to power and having an impact for the first time – as the normative 
democratic theories suggest. 
The Democratic Rupture: Public Exposure of 
Flaws in the Electoral System 
The roots of the NPP’s opposition victory can be traced to problems in 
earlier elections. In 2008 there were two rounds of voting, with the op-




position NDC emerging victorious. The elections were characterised by 
malpractices, and the final vote margin was less than 2 per cent. 
Amongst the most contentious issues was the integrity of the electoral 
register. For years, “a convenient myth” of Ghana’s electoral manage-
ment superiority was promoted by national and international organisa-
tions (Jockers, Kohnert, and Nugent 2010). Until 2012, the electoral 
system was peaceful and produced winners in an orderly fashion. Yet, 
each post-election assessment highlighted a problematic voter register 
and sophisticated electoral fraud by the NPP and the NDC, especially in 
their strongholds (interview, a party organiser, Kumasi, 15 September 
2017). The parties’ agents and some EC officers continued to collude to 
fix election results by purposefully transposing the digits in order to in-
crease or reduce the votes of a candidate (see Republic of Ghana 2013). 
The political parties contributed to bloated registers. In their strong-
holds, minors and even foreigners are regularly bussed in and assisted to 
register during mass registration exercises (Daily Graphic 2012). While the 
NPP was in favour of compiling a new register, the NDC supported 
cleaning up the existing one. The EC raised legal issues, saying that it did 
not have the power to delete the names of voters from the register. In 
2016 the Supreme Court (SC) intervened and ordered the EC to delete 
the names of 56,772 persons who registered with delegitimised National 
Health Insurance Scheme cards in (EC 2016a). 
While distrust of the electoral registrar has plagued most of Ghana’s 
elections, the 2012 irregularities triggered a different response from pre-
vious scenarios. While opposition parties had long called foul during the 
polling process and blamed incumbent regimes for spoiling the free and 
fair electoral process, the events of 2012 shifted the democratisation 
process altogether. In December 2012, the advanced electoral fraud 
scheme perpetuated by the major parties was made public by one of their 
own, Sarah Adwoa Safo, a 30-year-old lawyer and the NPP parliamentary 
candidate in the Dome Kwabenya constituency. The NPP party agents 
claimed that several thousand votes were subtracted from Adwoa’s vote 
tallies through transposition. This was the single most important incident 
that prompted the leadership of the NPP to order a re-tallying and re-
collation of votes declared in NDC strongholds, especially in the Volta 
region. The NPP was convinced it lost the elections because of several 
irregularities.5 The NPP petitioned the SC to annul the declared presi-
dential polls on the following grounds: “duplicate serial numbers,” 
                                                 
5 The NPP conducted its own research by gathering the Statement of Polls and 
Declaration of Results Forms, called “pink sheets.” 
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“over-voting,” “voting without biometric verification,” “duplicate poll-
ing station code,” “unknown polling stations,” and “no signature of 
presiding officer” (Republic of Ghana 2013). In this way, the dispute 
with the tally of the parliamentary election result in one constituency was 
a trigger for the nationwide re-collation of results. 
The presidential petition hearing was broadcasted live on national 
TV for eight months, providing new avenues of citizen participation for 
ordinary Ghanaians. New information and engagement contributed to 
greater democratic learning among the population. Staging a public dia-
logue provided an important arena for accountability and transparency. 
The revelations in court convinced many people that the EC and the 
country’s electoral system needed overhauling. Justice Jones Dotse 
blamed the EC chair for abdicating his supervisory role, stating in his 
scathing judgement,  
Bearing in mind the wealth of experience [Electoral Commission-
er] Dr. Afari-Gyan should have gained since 1993, I am of the 
considered view that he cannot entirely escape blame for the many 
infractions of the Returning Officers, Presiding Officers and their 
assistants and to some extent their printers. (Republic of Ghana 
2013: 421)6  
In line with our theory of democratic rupture, prominent Ghanaians called 
for electoral reforms. Kofi Annan, the former UN secretary general, said,  
This success must not blind us to the flaws in our electoral system 
that the judicial review has brought to light. All concerned need to 
work energetically to ensure that these flaws are addressed through 
the necessary institutional reforms. (See Myjoyonline.com 2016a)  
Consequently, the EC invited proposals for reforms from registered 
political parties and civil society organisations (see Gyampo 2017). Mean-
while, after 22 years at the helm, Afari-Gyan retired in 2015. The search 
for his replacement divided the political parties. In June 2015, President 
Mahama appointed Charlotte Kesson-Smith Osei chair of the Electoral 
Commission. 
Reforming the country’s electoral system and rebuilding the reputa-
tion of the EC was at the top of the new chair’s agenda. The EC tasked a 
Special Reform Committee made up of representatives of the political 
parties, governance institutions, and civil society organisations to synthe-
sise the various reforms proposed by the Supreme Court and the 
                                                 
6 Dr. Afari-Gyan served as chairman/head of the Electoral Commission of 
Ghana from 1993 to 2015. 




political parties. The committee submitted 27 reforms for implementa-
tion. The EC accepted and implemented 24 recommendations, saying it 
“aimed at improving the transparency, inclusiveness and credibility of 
the upcoming Presidential and Parliamentary elections” (EC 2016b). 
One of the most important reforms ordered that the work of elec-
tion officers be legally binding for all officials taking part in the election. 
The contentious issue of “pink sheets” without serial numbers – the 
grounds on which the NPP disputed the election – was addressed. The 
EC stated that it would serially number the Statement of Polls and Dec-
laration of Results Forms. The EC also agreed to set up a National 
Collation Centre that would be accessible to the media to demystify its 
“strong room.”7 Furthermore, the EC was required by law to give a copy 
of the final certified register to the registered political parties at least 21 
days before the election. At a meeting with the Inter-Party Advisory 
Committee (IPAC) held on 12 July 2016, the EC agreed to publish a list 
of all polling stations with their codes and locations three weeks before 
the elections. More importantly, the EC mandated its returning officers 
to give copies of proxy, special, and absent voter lists to candidates and 
parties, and returning officers were required to issue copies of collation 
sheets to candidates or their agents. 
However, a constitutional amendment bill sought to hold the elec-
tions a month early. In a secret vote, only 125 MPs voted for the change. 
Those who voted against the amendment claimed the EC was not ade-
quately prepared to hold the elections in November (see Myjoyonline.com 
2016b). In our interviews, several MPs said that the political rationale for 
the rejection was that the incumbent NDC wanted to buy time for the 
fruition of its projects under construction. One explained, “We need 
tangible evidence to campaign on, and many of our projects are still 
under construction” (interview, an NDC MP, Accra, 15 August 2016). 
Alternatively, an opposition politician said,  
We want to expose more acts of corruption, incompetence of the 
Mahama administration and also extend the suffering of the Gha-
naian people until December. It will be a coronation for the NPP 
in December. (Interview, an NPP parliamentary aspirant, Kumasi, 
25 August 2016) 
                                                 
7 The “strong room” is a room within the headquarters of the Electoral Com-
mission, where certified representatives of the contesting political parties meet 
to verify election results before they are published by the EC. The voting public 
perceived the strong room as a place where election results from the regions 
were manipulated in favour of a political party, usually the incumbent. This 
perception undermined the credibility of the EC. 
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Political Party Realignment 
Putting Their Houses in Order: Opposition Party
Campaign Organisation 
The decision of the electoral petition on 29 August 2013 changed the 
trajectory of election campaigns in Ghana. In a 5–4 ruling, Ghana’s SC 
dismissed the petition filed by the NPP that had challenged the validity 
of the 2012 presidential election (Republic of Ghana 2013). Nonetheless, 
a justice underscores the importance of the petition: “After this case, 
elections in Ghana will not be the same” (quoted in Akufo-Addo state-
ment after the verdict of the SC on 29 August 2013). 
The NDC and President John Mahama instantly enjoyed the legiti-
macy that the ruling conferred. But in terms of electoral reforms and 
future political capital, the NPP benefitted the most. Akufo-Addo’s 
speech expressing his acceptance of the SC ruling was widely circulated 
through TV and media. His mature democratic behaviour changed the 
perception many Ghanaians had of him. He enhanced his reputation as a 
statesman and one who was willing to sacrifice his political ambitions for 
the good of the country. His popularity soared, as evidenced by his suc-
cess in the 2014 presidential primaries, where he won more than 60 per 
cent support in each of the 275 constituencies across the country. 
While the NDC governed, the opposition started campaigning for 
the next election. The political settlement where the winner monopolises 
all state power fuels even greater perpetual campaigning (Abdulai and 
Hickey 2016). In January 2014, the NPP started its internal reorganisa-
tion with the election of polling station and constituency executives in all 
275 constituencies. It then elected ten regional executives. Many of the 
old executives lost their positions. In their place, a cadre of young and 
successful businessmen and other professionals were elected into posi-
tions to reorganise the party for the 2016 elections. For example, in the 
NPP’s stronghold in the Ashanti region, 32-year-old Bernard Antwi-
Boasiako defeated former MP Osei Prempeh (Graphic Online 2014).8 In 
the Western region, Kofi Atta Dickson Nketia, the owner of a pharma-
ceutical company, defeated the incumbent Nana Owusu Ankomah 
(Graphic Online 2014). In April 2014, the momentum continued to the 
level of national executives. Dissatisfied with the performance of incum-
bent executives, the party grassroots voted for change. All but the 
                                                 
8 This is despite the fact that he is a controversial politician who is mired in 
claims of involvement in illegal gold mining. 




National Women’s organiser, Otiko Afisah Djaba, lost their positions to 
younger partisans. 
On 18 October 2014, voting for the NPP’s 2016 presidential nomi-
nee took place simultaneously in all 275 constituencies across the 
country. The party’s grassroots preferred Akufo-Addo, while its aristo-
cratic wing supported Alan Kyerematen, replaying the 2007 and 2010 
primary contests.9 But internal party reforms had significant repercus-
sions for the race. The party expanded the Electoral College, giving the 
grassroots more power to decide the party’s presidential nominee.10 As 
one of the key architects of the reforms to expand the Electoral College 
from 2,400 electorates to over 120,000 electorates, Akufo-Addo reaped 
the benefits: he polled 117,413 votes (94.35 per cent) to emerge victori-
ous.11 Akufo-Addo quickly confirmed Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia as the 
party’s VP nominee. Bawumia, a former deputy governor of the Central 
Bank, hails from the Northern Region, one of the strongholds of the 
NDC. 
The NPP had its full campaign machine assembled more than a year 
before the general elections. While this reorganisation hypothetically 
could have occurred without the electoral petition, the timing in the 
immediate aftermath of the petition suggests that the party reorganisa-
tion was a direct result of the electoral petition defeat. In this way, the 
democratic rupture contributed to important opposition party realign-
ment that would set the stage for its victory in the 2016 election.  
Office Seekers: Political Parties, Candidates, and
Campaign Launches 
In August 2016, the NDC launched its campaign in the important swing 
region of Cape Coast. The newly constructed Cape Coast sports stadium 
was the venue, signalling that the NDC would base its campaign on 
infrastructural developments. President Mahama announced his running 
mate, Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, as well as the party’s national cam-
paign team and the parliamentary candidates. Speakers used the 
campaign theme “Changing Lives, Transforming Ghana” to extol the 
achievements of the Mahama administration. 
                                                 
9 Both candidates enjoyed support from elites. However, within the factional 
politics in the NPP, Kyerematen is Asante and close to the Kufuor faction, 
which is considered the aristocratic wing of the party. 
10 See Ichino and Nathan (2016) for a discussion of the effects of voter rules in 
Ghana’s primary elections. 
11 His challenger, Alan Kyerematen, secured l5,908 votes (4.75 per cent). 
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Ayee finds that the “electoral successes and failures of the NDC 
and NPP may be linked to their manifestos” (Ayee 2016a: 107). In Sep-
tember 2016, the NDC unveiled its manifesto in one of the crucial swing 
regions, Brong-Ahafo region. The 78-page document catalogued the 
NDC’s achievements (NDC 2016). The NDC’s manifesto promised 
more social welfare programmes and expansion of infrastructure across 
the country. The party produced vivid pictorial images of its achieve-
ments in the various sectors: health, agriculture, the economy, road and 
transportation, and education, among others (NDC 2016). The NDC 
compared its four-year record in office to the eight years of the Kufuor 
administration, and claimed that it had outperformed the NPP. 
As an opposition party, the NPP faced different challenges. Lacking 
funds, the NPP launched its national campaign and manifesto “Change: 
An Agenda for Jobs.” The 192-page document listed the challenges the 
country faced and proposed solutions. The manifesto proposed a radical 
transformation of the national economy, with job creation on the top of 
its agenda. Its flagship policy of “one dam, one village” and “one district, 
one factory” promised to improve agricultural production in the north-
ern savannah and also to give jobs to unemployed youth. 
Akufo-Addo captured the central theme of his party campaign 
when he said,  
My vision for Ghana is of an optimistic, self-confident and pros-
perous nation with a strong and thriving democratic society in 
which mutual trust and economic opportunities exist for all, irre-
spective of their background. (NPP Manifesto Launch, 10 
October 2016)12  
Bolstered by the legitimacy provided by the candidate’s role in the elec-
toral petition, a broad portion of the citizenry now viewed Akufo-Addo 





                                                 
12 The NPP implements policies that might not be expected from a centre-right, 
self-espoused “property-owning party,” including the national health insurance 
and free secondary education programmes. However, it always tries to differen-
tiate itself from the NDC by emphasising its ideological position as the party of 
the centre-right. 




New Avenues of Citizen Participation 
Political Party Vigilance 
The 2012 presidential election petition served as the democratic rupture 
that opened up political space for the opposition. In terms of electoral 
gains, the reforms recommended by the court favoured the opposition 
NPP.13 Indeed, the challenge itself was without precedent. The live 
broadcast of the court proceedings likely had a major impact on all 
stakeholders. President Akufo-Addo acknowledged the role played by 
the former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Georgina Wood, at a state 
dinner in her honour when he said,  
Her decision to broadcast proceedings of the celebrated election 
petition […] was an important moment in our country’s political 
evolution. It exposed the vagaries of our electoral system and 
compelled greater vigilance on the part of activists of my party 
which undoubtedly helped us to achieve the famous victory in 
December 2016. (Speech by Akufo-Addo, Accra, 14 July 2017)  
In addition, the 2016 election appeared more issue-based than previous 
polls, suggesting the deepening of democratic attitudes of the citizenry. 
The NPP set the agenda for an issue-based campaign with the release of 
several major policy statements. Public vigilance and civil society organi-
sations’ involvement pushed candidates and parties to stop using 
propaganda and invectives. Instead, the electorate demanded substance 
and more details of the parties’ proposed programmes. The Ghana Cen-
ter for Democratic Development’s pre-election survey identified the 
state of roads, electricity provision, the price of basic goods, and percep-
tions of corruption as the most important issues for voters in the 
election (CDD-Ghana 2016a). 
The NDC maintained its core base (about 44 per cent) but lost the 
votes of the floating voters and independents to the NPP’s presidential 
candidate.14 The NDC lost several “safe” parliamentary seats to NPP 
                                                 
13 Twenty-seven reforms the EC committee implemented came from the SC 
ruling. All 27 reforms were implemented, including declaration of results at the 
polling station, serial numbers on all the statements of polls, signature of agents 
and presiding officers, and many other reforms that promoted vigilance during 
the voting-tabulation process. 
14 The votes in most of the NDC’s strongholds did not decline. Rather, the Volta 
region vote likely declined because of the NPP strategy to stop cross-border 
voting. Pollster Ben Ephson estimates that the floating voters/independents 
constitute 5–8 per cent of the voting public. Consequently, there is suggestive 
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candidates, likely because of its imposition of candidates against the 
preferences of people at the grassroots.15 For example, this is best cap-
tured in the voices of two defeated ministers. The interior minister and 
NDC parliamentary candidate for the Navrongo Central constituency 
claimed, “I did not want to contest the seat again in the first place this 
year but there was pressure on me from the party” (see Ultimatefm-
online.com 2016a). Another defeated NDC parliamentary candidate for 
Sissala West constituency was reported to have said,  
I did not want to contest the seat in the first place, but there was 
pressure on me from the party. That is how come I contested. 
(See Ultimatefmonline.com 2016b) 
For the first time in the Fourth Republic, the NPP gained more seats in 
the northern savannah belt, an erstwhile NDC stronghold. The NPP 
won five seats in the Upper West region (Sissala East, Sissala West, Wa 
East, Lawra, and Nandom). We attribute this problem to how the par-
liamentary primaries were conducted, angering the people at the 
grassroots (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012). Though we cannot directly 
prove causality, the electoral petition served as a democratic rupture 
because it directly contributed to citizen vigilance and opposition party 
realignment, which contributed to the NPP’s victory in 2016. 
Politicians from the diaspora typically enjoy the endorsement of na-
tional party executives to the disadvantage of “local boys and girls.” In 
the parliamentary primaries for the Nandom constituency, for example, 
the NDC party bosses endorsed Richard Kuuire, a man with a distin-
guished career in international diplomacy. The grassroots candidate was 
the incumbent district chief executive, Cuthbert Baba Kuupiel. However, 
he could not match the well-funded campaign of the former UN officer 
and lost the party primaries. While Kuuire’s opponent, Ambrose Dery of 
the NPP, was a household name in the district, Kuuire was relatively 
unknown to the people on the ground. A similar situation played out in 
the adjacent Lawra constituency, another NDC safe seat. Many aggrieved 
and defeated “local boys” expressed their dissatisfaction by becoming 
independent. The NDC candidates split their votes, allowing the NPP to 
emerge victorious. 
The state of the Ghanaian economy was one of the most important 
issues in the election. Persistent economic challenges of high youth un-
                                                                                                    
evidence that the independents punished Mahama. In addition, internal party 
disputes in some areas contributed to the NPP victory in those areas. 
15 We provide evidence of this from Nandom, Sissala West, and Navrongo Cen-
tral constituencies below. 




employment, power cuts, inflation, and unsustainable debt levels domi-
nated the campaign. Voters sought a leader who could be trusted to 
manage the economy and spur employment, and this worked to the 
NPP’s favour. More than 70 per cent of Ghanaians believed the econo-
my was headed in the wrong direction (CDD-Ghana 2016a). The price 
of basic goods increased: the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
showed fluctuation in the year-on-year inflation rate on the price level of 
goods and services that households consume.  
Similarly, services were unreliable but very expensive for the ordi-
nary Ghanaian. Ghanaians enjoy subsidies on a variety of services such 
as petroleum products, water, and electricity. Acute power cuts paralysed 
economic activities. The country endured a 24-hour-off-12-hours-on 
“load shedding.” In addition, in 2015 the government imposed energy 
sector levies and taxes, causing great discomfort to the public (see 
Myjoyonline.com 2016b). Ghanaians pay a lower electricity tariff than their 
neighbours (MacLean et al. 2016). The Electricity Company of Ghana 
installed a new billing software, severely hurting household budgets. The 
installation of what Ghanaians termed “Usain Bolt” prepaid meters 
worsened the situation. The NPP presidential nominee politicised the 
situation when he claimed, “Can you believe that today in Ghana, for the 
ordinary Ghanaian, the cost of electricity is more than the cost of their 
rent?” (Akufo-Addo 2016).  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics claim the coun-
try’s growth rate dropped from 14 per cent in 2011 to 3.9 per cent in 
2015. The NDC administration claimed that the implementation of the 
new Single Spine Pay Policy for public sector workers in 2010 caused the 
growth problems (Ayee 2016b). However, fluctuations in the global 
economy contributed to new problems. For example, the collapse of 
export commodity prices on the world market put pressure on the coun-
try’s tax revenue.16 With few available options, the Mahama administra-
tion was forced to open negotiations with the IMF for a three-year 
stabilisation programme. The NPP interpreted the deal with the IMF as a 
sign of bad management. They claimed the Kufuor administration had 
been able to wane Ghana off of the IMF’s inhumane policies even with-
out the benefit of oil revenue. 
While it is possible to attribute the NPP’s victory to the state of the 
economy or to anger at corruption, these structural conditions have not 
been enough to defeat incumbent presidents in the past. These structural 
                                                 
16 According to the Ghana Chamber of Mines, in 2014 revenues from gold min-
ing fell 17.4 per cent from 2013, to USD 3.8 billion. 
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factors are not directly attributable to the democratic rupture, but they 
take on new meaning in the broader political context of an empowered 
opposition. In other words, the political opening provided by the demo-
cratic rupture enabled the NPP to gain a voice in matters of the econo-
economy, allowing them to enter the decision-making arena as a viable 
actor. Through this process, they were able to mobilise new supporters, 
who had seemed unattainable in previous electoral cycles. 
Mobilising New Supporters 
The Mahama administration struggled to address unemployment. The 
NPP’s campaign directive to “assess your current situation and vote for 
change” resonated with many unemployed youth. It is plausible to argue 
that many of the one million newly registered voters voted for the NPP 
(Ali, personal communication, 15 December 2016).17 The emerging 
Ghanaian political culture of “two terms and you’re out” coupled with 
voting dynamics in swing regions also contributed to the NPP’s victory 
(see Table 2 below). Since 1992, Ghanaians have developed a propensity 
to vote out governments after two terms (Daddieh 2011). The general 
feeling is that while one term may be too short a time for a ruling party 
to demonstrate what it is capable of doing for the country, two terms is 
long enough. At that point, failure to perform satisfactorily can no longer 
be justified. The Mahama administration tried very hard to distance itself 
from the Mills administration (2008–2012). The NPP, on the other hand, 
noted that the party had its eight-year term: “You have been in high 
office for eight solid years – four years as vice president, four years as 
president,” and that it was therefore time for a change (see Classfm-
online.com 2016). 
Presidential party tickets are often constructed to gain support 
among specific regional populations. In 2012, when Vice President Ma-
hama (from the Northern Region) took over as president after the death 
of John Atta Mills (from the Central Region), Mahama selected a rela-
tively unknown Central Bank governor, Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, as 
his running mate. The selection of a running mate from the late presi-
dent’s home region paid homage to his memory and consolidated 
Mahama’s support in the important swing region. That Mahama’s wife is 
from Jema-Ampoma in the Nkoranza District of the Brong-Ahafo re-
gion also paid electoral dividends. However, localised issues in some of 
                                                 
17 Pre-election surveys and focus group discussions showed that first-time voters 
were most likely to cast a vote for the opposition – roughly 7 out 10. The rea-
son cited is future employment prospects (CDD-Ghana 2016a). 




these swing regions made it difficult for the NDC to win votes in the 
2016 elections. For example, many residents of the Brong-Ahafo region 
lost their investments after the DKM Microfinance, God Is Love, and 
Jastor Motors financial institutions collapsed.18 Nonetheless, the opposi-
tion politicised the issue (see, Citifmonline.com 2016). 


































































Source: EC 2018. 
Note: r/o – run-off election. 
Akufo-Addo’s selection of Bawumia paid off, as the NPP gained more 
votes in the north than it had won in 2012 (see Table 1). In 2008 
Bawumia was seen as an outsider. The 2012 democratic rupture helped 
Bawumia gain power and publicity. Indeed, he earned his place in the 
party after the election petition, in which he was the star witness. The 
supposedly submissive and humble Bawumia complemented the NPP’s 
ticket. Additionally, his sharp intellect, strong command of issues, and 
forceful responses during the litigation endeared him to many Ghana-
ians. He became the NPP campaign’s leading voice on the economy and 
economic policy. 
The electoral petition provided a new space for Akufo-Addo and 
Bawumia to convince Ghanaians that they could stabilise the economy 
and govern the country effectively. Compared to previous campaigns, 
Bawumia was more visible than the NDC’s Amissah-Arthur. He even 
challenged the sitting VP to a debate on the economy. Added to the 
“Bawumia factor” was his 36-year-old wife, who canvassed for votes 
among Muslim communities across the country. More significantly, the 
NPP introduced the Zongo Development Fund, which promised Mus-
lims living in urban slums better opportunities for jobs and development. 
                                                 
18 The lack of supervision on the part of the Central Bank allowed the scam to go 
on unnoticed. 
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The youthful couple had cross-party appeal, which attracted independent 
votes. 
Party organisation and campaign messages also contributed to the 
opposition victory. The NDC’s achievements were summed up in giant 
billboards dotted across the urban landscape. But these infrastructural 
development politics, or “project politics,” were abstract to many ordi-
nary Ghanaians. As a consequence, the NDC created a vacuum when it 
failed to both communicate the importance of the infrastructure it con-
structed across the country and describe where the youth would fit into 
the country’s transformation. The NPP capitalised on the poor commu-
nication machinery of the NDC and engaged in populism. It spoke the 
language of the street by posing the question, “Do we eat bridges, roads 
and airports?” 
In contrast, the NPP learnt lessons from its 2012 defeat and the ex-
perience at the Supreme Court. As a consequence, it constructed a solid 
party organisation to drive its campaign. The party had a decentralised 
campaign strategy and focused on each constituency, delivering a cam-
paign message that was tied to local issues (e.g. “one village, one dam” in 
the northern savannah). Party activists organised mini rallies and invited 
the presidential nominee to talk, improving personal linkages to the 
grassroots. Former MPs and party activists were given formal training on 
how to deliver the party message using the door-to-door campaign strat-
egy. The localised campaign strategy saw regional executives employing 
legitimate and unorthodox schemes to mobilise voters. For example, in 
the NDC stronghold in the Volta region, the NPP strategy codenamed 
“Vigilance and Reduction” deployed party activists to prevent Ghanaians 
who live in Togo from coming to vote.19 The party succeeded in sup-
pressing the NDC votes in the Volta region (see Table 1 above). 
The NPP also invested heavily in information and communication 
technologies to monitor the transmission of election results. It recruited 
and trained personnel to work the polling stations. The NPP hired the 
services of Joseph Anokye, a telecommunications engineering service 
manager at NASA. Anokye in turn, requested two technologically literate 
members from each of the 275 constituencies. A comprehensive data 
system was set up linking all the 275 constituencies. The NPP was able 
to collate the results in real time at their collation centres, helping to 
prevent voter fraud. 
                                                 
19 This is similar to the exclusive campaign strategies documented in Klaus and 
Paller (2017) in Greater Accra. 




Ghana’s strong executive presidential system typically benefits the 
party in government. At the same time, executive power can undermine 
incumbents during campaigns. The president is blamed for all economic 
and social challenges facing the country, and the opposition is quick to 
politicise the president’s unpopular decisions. For example, the Mahama 
administration’s decision to accept two Yemenis freed from Guantana-
mo Bay polarised the country. The NPP, civil society organisations, and 
even the Catholic Church condemned the decision, arguing that the men 
were a security threat, damaging the NDC’s electoral fortunes. 
Furthermore, the NPP accused the NDC of abusing its incumben-
cy. For example, in June 2016, panelists on a private radio station in 
Accra with links to the NDC made offensive pronouncements about the 
chief justice and other justices of the SC. The host of the radio pro-
gramme and his two panelists were charged with criminal contempt and 
jailed for four months. Against the counsel of his lawyer, the president 
pardoned the so-called “Montie three” and they were freed from jail 
after one month. The president’s act was seen as the executive interfer-
ing in the work of the judiciary, with one civil society organisation saying 
it amounted to “the most vulgar misuse of executive power.”20 The an-
ger that followed President Mahama’s actions likely impacted independ-
ent voters. In the past, blaming the incumbent candidate was not an 
effective campaign strategy. But after the 2012 electoral petition, this 
strategy offered new opportunities for the opposition to be seen as the 
“democratic” party, in contrast to the incumbent, which had more au-
thoritarian tendencies, providing a significant shift in the logic of rule. 
A number of scholars have noted the burgeoning middle class in 
African countries (e.g. Nathan 2016). Hamidu (2015) shows how return-
ee diasporas – members of the growing middle class – participate in 
Ghanaian politics. In 2014 a group calling itself “Concerned Ghanaians 
for Responsible Governance” (CGRG) launched in Accra. It organised 
the demonstration called #OccupyFlagstaffHouse. The movement used 
social media sites to recruit members and spread information to the 
public, demanding transparency in state affairs. These activities used 
social media to galvanise the growing middle class, providing an avenue 
of critique against the NDC government’s policies. In addition, many of 
these individuals were drawn into politics to work on the electoral peti-
tion. The electoral petition provided a new avenue for the emerging 
middle class and diasporans who had recently returned to the country to 
get engaged in electoral politics. 
                                                 
20 See CDD-Ghana (2016b) Statement on the Montie Case.  
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Against the backdrop of the harsh economic conditions and corrup-
tion, the NDC government was unpopular in the lead up to the 2016 
polls. But the 2012 election petition served as the crucial democratic 
rupture that opened new avenues of citizen participation and led to im-
portant realignments in the opposition party that expanded the latter’s 
political support. In the end, experts describe the incumbent’s defeat as 
“monumental,” “humiliating,” and “without precedent” (Gyampo, Gra-
ham, and Yobo 2017; Rawlings 2016). For the opposition, the victory 
has been described as “historic.” The electoral petition goes a long way 
towards explaining the opposition victory, suggesting how a democratic 
rupture can be an important mechanism in the democratisation-by-elec-
tions framework.  
Conclusion 
Even though democratic backsliding threatens African countries, and 
some authoritarian characteristics were apparent in the lead up to Gha-
na’s 2016 election, the conditions to sustain Ghana’s democratisation 
were present. We find support for Lindberg’s democratisation-by-elec-
tions thesis. The reiteration of multiparty elections in Ghana since 1992 
has led to an improvement in the electoral system and to the consolida-
tion of a democratic political culture. 
However, democratisation is not a linear process. Instead, we sug-
gest that democratic ruptures are important mechanisms in the process 
of democratic deepening, yet they are typically left out of statistical mod-
els. We suggest that democratic ruptures are important additions to the 
democratisation-by-elections framework. The most significant democrat-
ic rupture in Ghana’s electoral process was the presidential election 
challenge in 2012, mounted by the losing opposition party. The presiden-
tial election petition took Ghana into unchartered territory as far as the 
conduct of electoral politics is concerned. It opened both new avenues 
of political participation for citizens and political space for the opposi-
tion party to realign and strengthen its support. 
Indeed, while the 2012 election was judged to be generally free and 
fair, the petitioners’ case highlighted several previously unexamined prac-
tices and procedures including voter registration, biometric voting, vote 
counting, collation and transmission, the role of polling agents, and the 
legal treatment of agents provocateurs, including ballot-box snatchers. The 
outcome of the litigation compelled the parties – especially the NPP – to 
be vigilant at the polling stations. It also led to a more critical electorate, 
enhancing the potential for democratic accountability. The SC case con-




tributed to widespread democratic learning, as well as wide-ranging elec-
toral reforms. In the end, it contributed to a landslide victory for the 
opposition. 
Our argument offers several lessons for other African countries, es-
pecially those with strong incumbent leaders and parties, centralised state 
apparatuses that fuel political clientelism, and high levels of party compe-
tition. These include – but are not limited to – Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and South 
Africa. Democratic ruptures can have positive and negative consequenc-
es. The Ghanaian case we analyse in this paper is an example of when 
democratic ruptures contribute to political development. The Kenyan 
Supreme Court’s annulment of the August 2017 presidential election 
could also be considered a democratic rupture. However, the lack of 
institutional reforms undermined the confidence of the political elites 
and its citizens, and the impact on Kenya’s political development is still 
unknown. Therefore, the different institutional environments where 
democratic ruptures occur will inform their resolution and their conse-
quences. 
First, repetitive elections contribute to the deepening of democracy 
and to the entrenchment of a democratic culture. But democratic rup-
tures, in the form of challenging electoral results using institutional 
means, can lead to further democratic consolidation. Second, democratic 
ruptures are different than mass protests in the streets. Electoral institu-
tions are strengthened if the institutional process is public and 
transparent, and citizens are educated on the decision-making process. 
Additionally, opposition politicians can gain politically – and later elec-
torally – if they follow the legal procedures and accept the decisions of 
the court. Third, the impact of democratic ruptures on the grassroots is 
crucial. The reorganisation and alignment of political parties, and the 
decisions they make during their electoral campaigns can help overcome 
structural constraints parties might face. This is especially important for 
opposition parties. Democratic ruptures can open new political space for 
politicians not affiliated with the ruling party. 
Ghana’s democracy was subjected to its most exacting test yet dur-
ing the 2016 general elections. The democratisation-by-elections frame-
work helps explain why the country overcame serious obstacles to hold 
another free, fair, and credible poll. But the framework – as well as exist-
ing theoretical explanations – is limited in explaining both how the 
opposition won in such an overwhelming fashion and the crucial re-
forms that contributed to the successful polls. By examining the 
democratic rupture in the electoral process, we are able to show im-
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portant dynamics at the grassroots that occur between polling periods, 
and how they contribute to the deepening of democracy. 
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Demokratische Brüche und Wahlergebnisse in Afrika:  
Ghanas Wahl im Jahr 2016 
 
Zusammenfassung: Sich periodisch wiederholende Wahlen sind wich-
tige Maßstäbe für die Beurteilung von afrikanischen Demokratien. Doch 
die Prozesse, durch die Wahlen eine demokratische Kultur verankern, 
bleiben zu wenig erforscht. Wir führen einen wichtigen Mechanismus 
ein, den wir als demokratischen Bruch bezeichnen: Eine Verletzung des 
Demokratisierungsprozesses während der Wahlen, die zu einer Verfas-
sungskrise führen könnte. Diese eröffnet einen neuen Weg der Bürger-
beteiligung außerhalb der Wahlen und des politischen Raums für die 
Neuausrichtung der Opposition und stärkt deren Unterstützung. Am 
Beispiel der Präsidentschaftswahl in Ghana 2012 zeigen wir, wie der 
erfolgte demokratische Bruch der Opposition ihre politische Entwick-
lung ermöglicht und dieser 2016 zum Sieg verholfen hat. Erstens wurden 
Schwachstellen im Wahlsystem aufgedeckt, die zu Forderungen nach 
Wahlreformen führten. Zweitens förderte er eine im Wahlprozess besser 
geschulte Bürgerbeteiligung. Drittens lehrte er politischen Parteien, dass 
Wachsamkeit in den Wahllokalen zu Wahlgewinnen führen kann. Der 
Artikel liefert eine kritische Analyse der Faktoren, die insbesondere in 
Fällen, in denen Oppositionsparteien etablierte Politiker besiegen, die 
demokratische Entwicklung prägen. 
 
Schlagwörter: Ghana, demokratischer Bruch, Demokratisierung, wie-
derholende Wahlen, Mehrparteien 
 
